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Abstract 
 
AGCC countries' output is heavily dichotomized into oil and non-oil. The oil shocks have 
similar effects on all member countries but little is known about their responses to non-oil 
shocks. This paper sets out to determine whether (1) aggregate demand (AD) and non-oil 
supply shocks (AS) are symmetrical across these countries to justify their suitability for 
monetary union; and (2) whether there is any commonality of shocks with the United States 
and the three major European countries, namely France, Germany, and Italy, which can 
warrant the choice of either the US dollar or the Euro as the anchor for the expected common 
currency of the bloc. We use bivariate structural vector autoregression models identified with 
long-run restrictions a la Blanchard and Quah (1989) to extract the shocks. Our results show 
that (a) AD shocks are unequivocally symmetrical but non-oil AS shocks are weakly 
symmetrical across AGCC countries thereby giving a green light for monetary union; (b) 
neither AD nor AS shocks are symmetrical between AGCC countries and the selected 
European countries; (c) AGCC's AD shocks are symmetrical with the US but non-oil AS 
shock are not. We therefore surmise that the US dollar is a far better candidate for the new 
currency than the Euro since US monetary policy can at least help smooth demand shocks in 
AGCC countries. Our results hold even when we consider the AGCC countries as a bloc. 
This paper makes a valuable contribution to AGCC decision makers who have been wrestling 
with the dilemma of whether to revalue or to depeg their actual currencies.  
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Monetary Union Among Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (AGCC) Countries: Does the 
symmetry of shocks extend to the non-oil sector? 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this paper we address two key empirical questions. First, to what extent do the non-oil 
sectors of AGCC countries, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE), satisfy the prerequisite of common shocks for monetary 
union?1 Second, does the degree of shocks symmetry or asymmetry between AGCC 
countries and either the United States (US) or the three largest European economies (France, 
Germany, and Italy) warrant the choice of either the US dollar or the Euro or a combination 
of the two as the anchor for the newly proposed single currency? This paper is motiva
the upcoming signing of a monetary union by AGCC countries in 2010 and the issuance o
single currency, which is to be pegged to the US dollar. Also, since the recent decline in the 
value of the dollar relative to the Euro and other major currencies has opened the way for 
many to question the merit of the dollar as a solid anchor; we are particularly interested in 
determining how suitable of an alternative the Euro could be for these countries.  
ted by 
f a 
                                                
 
There is an abundant literature focusing on the choice of exchange rate regime and on the 
dollarization of economies. Most notably, is the seminal paper of Mundell (1961) on 
optimum currency area (OCA) along with subsequent works by McKinnon (1963), Kenen 
(1969), and Tower and Willet (1976) that stress the importance of relative economic sizes, 
labor mobility, degree of openness, trade concentration, and similarity of shocks for assessing 
the suitability of fixed, flexible exchange rate regimes, and prospective monetary unions. The 
determination of the degree of symmetry between shocks across countries has been thus far 
the most popular criterion used in empirical works to evaluate OCAs. According to this 
 
1 It is worth noting that the government of Oman has officially pulled out of the monetary union initiative in 
2007 due to their inability to meet inflation targets. 
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approach, one needs to examine whether aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks are 
correlated across member countries to conclude on the desirability of monetary union, ceteris 
paribus. In this paper, not only are we interested in the suitability of either the US dollar or 
the Euro as the principal anchor for the new AGCC currency, but we also pay close attention 
to  the symmetry of shocks both across and  between member countries and possible anchor 
countries.  
 
The debate on whether fixed regimes are better than floating regimes, vice-versa, is a very 
old one. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, monetary policy is imported and as long as 
fiscal and monetary disciplines are in order at home, inflation and output tend to be stable. 
The costs are forgone potential seignorage revenue, inability to respond to asymmetric 
shocks, among others. Under flexible exchange rate systems, countries usually experience 
higher inflation and lower growth but are better equipped to respond to economic shocks 
since the conduct of monetary policy rests with their central banks. However, the theory of 
optimum currency areas is clear on its prescriptions regarding the choice of exchange rate 
regime. Countries that are subjected to idiosyncratic shocks are better off in retaining 
monetary policy independence while those that are subjected to symmetric shocks may opt 
for a fixed exchange rate system. In this regard, it is the symmetry of shocks that dictates 
whether the Euro or the dollar is the suitable currency to peg the new currency to.  
 
Following the work of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994), output and prices are two key 
macroeconomic variables whose dynamics have been intensely scrutinized to gauge 
aggregate supply (AS) and aggregate demand (AD) shocks. However, in the case of AGCC 
countries, it is well-known that output is highly dichotomized. About 54 percent of total 
output for the group comes from the non-oil sector while the oil sector contributes the 
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remaining 46 percent. An important feature of these economies is that they already face 
symmetric shocks in the oil sector which partially justify the undertaking of currency 
unification and eventually the pegging of that currency to the US dollar. Since oil output is 
traded in US dollar in the international market, they all react similarly to shocks tributary to 
that sector. Whether they themselves produce those shocks by curtailing production via the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) or respond to those shocks 
emanating from increase or decrease in demand. 
 
 There have been renewed efforts from AGCC governments to reduce their reliance on the oil 
sector through reinvestment of oil revenues in infrastructure, tourism, construction, and other 
services in an attempt to further diversify their economies. In essence, the fundamental issue 
we address in this research is whether the growing importance of the non-oil sector for these 
economies likely to impose substantial adjustment costs if their responses to shocks are not 
synchronized.  
 
The case of AGCC countries is peculiar. All member countries but Kuwait have had their 
currencies pegged to the US dollar since the 1970s. With the apparent demise of the US 
dollar as a reserve currency and the rise in inflation, there have been calls for a revaluation of 
individual currencies with respect to the dollar, and in some cases, for even a de-peg of the 
currency to the US dollar in favor of either  the Euro or a basket peg.  Since the AGCC 
countries plan to achieve a monetary union by 2010 and peg their new currency to the US 
dollar, it is imperative to test whether AGCC countries and the US are subjected to similar 
macroeconomic shocks, notwithstanding, it is monetary policy from the US that will shape 
the path of non-oil output and prices in these countries as an economic bloc. Since there have 
also been calls for the adoption of the Euro or a basket peg with major currencies such as the 
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Euro and the dollar, it is a natural extension while we are extracting the shocks to look into 
the suitability of alternative anchors. In view of the fact that the Euro would play the same 
role as the dollar for the AGCC countries, we investigate whether shocks from AGCC 
countries and the core European economies are symmetric.  
 
The approach taken in this paper is in line with previous works in the literature (Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen, 1994; Horvath and Rátfai, 2004) that employ bivariate structural vector 
autoregression (SVAR) of output growth and inflation identified with long-run restrictions à 
la Blanchard and Quah (1989). We compute these variables using data on non-oil output, real 
GDP, and GDP deflator for the period 1970 - 2006 from the United Nations Statistical 
Databases – National Accounts Main Aggregates. In the case of AGCC countries, our 
SVARs contain non-oil GDP growth and inflation. For the potential anchor countries, we use 
data on real GDP since we have no reason to breakdown their output into oil and non-oil 
components. Non-oil GDP can be seen as a proxy for industrial production, which is a 
subcomponent of real GDP. Therefore, there is no great loss of information from calculating 
the correlation between shocks originating from SVAR with non-oil output growth and those 
emerging from real GDP growth. We employ the long-run restriction that only non-oil supply 
(supply) shocks can have long-term effects on non-oil output (output) to identify our model.  
Our results show at the 5% significance level that: (a) although demand as well as supply 
shocks are symmetric for core European countries, these shocks are mostly asymmetric with 
shocks affecting AGCC countries; (b) AGCC non-oil supply shocks are asymmetric with US 
supply shocks; (c) with the exception of the UAE, demand shocks are mostly symmetric 
between AGCC countries and the US; (d) On average non-oil supply shocks as well as 
demand shocks are symmetric across AGCC countries, with the latter showing a tighter link. 
These results clearly suggest that there are major adjustment costs involved for AGCC 
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countries if they chose to anchor their new currency with the Euro. Despite its continuous 
decline vis-à-vis other currencies, the US dollar remains a better option since monetary policy 
from the US can smooth demand shocks both at home and in the AGCC countries. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4 discusses the empirical background 
Section 3 presents the underlying theory and the SVAR methodology. Section 4 describes 
and analyzes the data in details. Section 5 discusses the empirical results and Section 6 
concludes the paper.   
 
Section 2 Background 
There are few studies on monetary union issue between AGCC countries, with differing 
findings, that follow the footsteps of previous studies on European Union. These studies 
typically look at the suitability of monetary union from a standpoint of costs and benefits for 
each country. The focus is mostly on convergence criteria, primarily, comparisons of 
inflation, real GDP growth, fiscal imbalances, tariff structures, current accounts, debt to GDP 
ratio, non-oil fiscal deficits, intra-regional trade volume and movement in real effective 
exchange rate across countries (Sturm and Siegfried, 2005; Pattanaik, 2007; Dar and Presley, 
2001; Jadresic, 2002; Iqbal and Fasano, 2003; Fasano and Schaechter, 2003; Fasano and 
Iqbal, 2002, 2003; Hebous, 2006; Laabas and Limam, 2002; Oman Economic Review, 2002; 
and Ibrahim, 2004,). The most comprehensive of all these studies is Sturm and Siegfried 
(2005). Although these authors do look into the similarity of economic structures among 
member states and conclude that these structures are largely dominated by the production of 
oil and gas, they did not focus on the responses of these countries to similar macroeconomic 
shocks.  
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The most thorough empirical study in the literature on AGCC monetary union thus far is 
Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2006), which is closest to ours. These authors use bivariate 
structural vector autoregression of total output and prices identified with long-run restrictions 
to extract aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks for the AGCC countries. They also 
rely on correlation analysis along with cointegration and common cycle tests to assess the 
long-run movements in real output across countries and to uncover the existence or lack 
thereof of common short-run cycles. Their findings show that while the transitory demand 
shocks are typically symmetric, the permanent supply shocks are asymmetric. It is worth 
noting that Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn did not find synchronous long-run and short-run 
movements in output for AGCC countries.  
 
Besides Buiter's (2007) reservations on the use of long-run restrictions, it is important to note 
that there are two key shortcomings to Abu-Bader et al.'s (2006) paper. The first is related to 
the use of aggregate instead of non-oil output to measure macroeconomic shocks, which 
makes it difficult to disentangle symmetry from asymmetry of supply shocks. Since output is 
subject to both oil- and non-oil supply shocks, it is the relative magnitude of these shocks that 
can determine the overall disturbances to the economy of each member country. Oil-related 
supply shocks are most likely common to all AGCC countries, but what we do not know for 
sure is whether the non-oil sectors across these countries are subjected to the same shocks, 
and there are no empirical studies thus far on this issue. As Buiter also reported, the empirical 
studies cited earlier present overwhelming statistical and econometric evidences on the 
differing structure of these economies.  Moreover, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994, p.10) 
noted that for countries where output is denominated by the production of oil (or other raw 
materials), a rise in the price of oil is likely to increase both total output (due to the boost in 
oil production) and aggregate demand (through the impact of oil revenues on real incomes). 
 8
As they emphasized, it may be difficult for oil-producing countries to distinguish between 
aggregate demand and aggregate supply disturbances caused by a change in oil prices.  
 
The second shortcoming to Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn's paper is that their analysis is mute on 
the choice of currency anchor for AGCC countries, which, in our view, is crucial. In the 
current state of economic integration between AGCC countries, does it really matter whether 
supply shocks are not symmetric if there are no other objectives beyond forming the 
monetary union? Five of the six countries have their currencies pegged to the US dollar. 
Whether external factors give rise to more serious supply shocks or not, the tools these 
countries possess currently to neutralize the effects of those shocks would be the same after 
entering the monetary union since they have decided to peg their unified currency to the US 
dollar. Hence, the pertinent question rather is whether the choice of the US dollar as the 
continued anchor is more appropriate than the option of adopting the Euro or a market basket 
or a free float.  
 
Our paper represents an improvement over Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn's in the two aspects 
mentioned above. We consider our approach of incorporating non-oil output instead of total 
output in the SVAR and allow for demand shocks to possibly account for the impact of oil 
shocks on real incomes is relatively new to the literature. In addition, following Horvath and 
Rátfai (2004), we use France, Germany, and Italy as core European countries to determine 
whether supply and demand shocks from these countries are synchronized with those of 
AGCC countries, which could justify the use of the Euro as an alternative anchor currency.    
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Section 3 Theory and Methodology 
The underlying theoretical framework of this paper is the aggregate demand (AD) and 
aggregate supply (AS) model.2 The short-run AS curve is upward sloping allowing for 
changes in AD to influence output. The long-run AS (LRAS) curve is vertical denoting 
potential output and prevents AD shocks to have long-term real effects on the economy. AD 
curve is downward sloping. In a price-output space, full employment equilibrium is achieved 
when all three curves intersect at once. A positive supply shock shifts both AS and LRAS to 
the right giving rise to an increase in output and a decrease in price permanently.  A positive 
demand shock, though permanent, can only affect output temporarily due to its impacts first 
on prices, then on real wages and other price-sensitive determinants of AS. More precisely, 
this implies that output and prices move in the same direction when demand shocks hit the 
economy, and in opposite directions due to supply shocks. However, actual data for AGCC 
countries may not display these impulse response patterns since these economies' output is 
largely dominated by oil production, the points made by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994). In 
other words, for countries with oil as a large share of their output, an increase in oil prices has 
also the real potential to insulate aggregate demand as oil revenues find their ways in other 
sectors and thereby increase real incomes. Since it might be "… difficult to distinguish 
between AS and AD shocks caused by a change in oil prices", impulse responses may be 
counter intuitive or even misleading. 
 
We use a bivariate SVAR model with the right-hand side variables being log differences of 
non-oil output times 100 (∆yt) and log differences of prices times 100 (∆pt). Each of these 
variables is driven by both a non-oil supply shock (est) and a demand shock (edt).  Using the 
                                                 
2The diagram is not reported here as in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) and Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2006) 
due to space consideration.  
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lag operator L, the infinite moving average representation of the structural model can be 
represented as: 
⎥⎦
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The model is identified with a long-run restriction à la Blanchard and Quah (1989). We 
therefore assume that only non-oil supply shocks can have long-run effects on non-oil output. 
This implies the cumulative effects of demand shocks on the growth rate of non-oil output 
(∆yt) are zero. That is,  
∑∞
=
=
0
,12 0
i
iα           (2) 
Since the SVAR methodology is standard in the literature, we do not provide further details 
regarding the procedures of extracting the unobserved structural shocks.3 There is also the 
controversy surrounding the interpretation of shocks with permanent impact on output as 
supply disturbances, and shocks with temporary effects on output as demand innovations, 
found in Buiter (2007). However, we do not enter into this debate because there is always a 
reason to argue in favor or against specific restrictions. The SVAR methodology has lent 
itself to this criticism. 
 
Section 4 Data and Estimation 
The annual data set used for the empirical analysis covers the period 1970 – 2006. The series 
include non-oil GDP at constant 1990 prices in US dollar calculated as the total value added 
of all sectors but mining and quarrying; GDP deflator with 1990 as base year due to 
unavailability of consumer price index (CPI). All were taken from United Nations Statistical 
                                                 
3The interested readers may wish to consult Hamilton (1994), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994), Enders (2004), 
Amisano and Giannini (1997) among others. 
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Databases – National Accounts Main Aggregates. We take the AGCC member countries as if 
they were a union already and construct the non-oil output and GDP deflator variables for 
this bloc by taking the averages of the respective member countries' non-oil output and GDP 
deflator.4 This enables us to anticipate their reactions to shocks from the US and Europe. The 
series were then tested for unit roots using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-
Perron (PP) tests and were found to be integrated of order 1 or non-stationary.5  
 
As a prelude to the empirical estimation, it is customary to look at the raw data in order to 
form an idea about the possible relationship among the variables. Table 1 reports the mean 
and standard deviations for real non-oil output growth and inflation for all AGCC countries, 
the US and the three core European countries. It shows that all the AGCC countries have 
experienced higher growth and higher inflation rates than the US and the European countries. 
However, when volatilities are considered, their non-oil output growth is at least 3 times less 
stable than that of the US and the European countries. Inflation appears to follow a similar 
pattern but with a lesser gap in relative variability to the selected European countries. The 
same holds for the AGCC countries as a bloc while the US is by far the most stable economy 
on all accounts. This table indicates that a move of the AGCC countries away from the US 
dollar as their principal anchor currency towards the Euro is a move from a low- to a high- 
inflation shelter, which is suboptimal, since there is no accompanying gain in employment.6 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
                                                 
4 Although Saudi Arabia is the largest economy of all AGCC countries and the remaining members differ in 
terms of economic sizes, we did not take a weighted average.  
5 The unit root results are available upon request 
6 All AGCC countries import foreign labor from the rest of the world. The short-run Phillips curve prediction of 
a tradeoff between unemployment an inflation may not hold for these countries.  
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Table 2 presents the cross-country correlations of AGCC real non-oil output growth with the 
USA and core European countries. We could only find two significant positive co-
movements in non-oil output growth: Bahrain with France and Bahrain with Italy. These 
might be due to Bahrain status as an offshore country. Overall, AGCC countries' non-oil 
output is not correlated with either the US or the three European Countries. Table 3 depicts 
the cross-correlations of inflation. It shows that all AGCC countries' inflation save the UAE 
is significantly correlated with the US's. But the same cannot be said in relation with the 
European countries. Not a single correlation is significant.  Again, there is no gain for AGCC 
countries in switching to the Euro, despite the tighter trade linkages with Europe.   
  
Table 2 about here 
Table 3 about here 
 
Table 4 summarizes the cross-country correlations of real non-oil output and inflation among 
AGCC countries. With the exception of the UAE where a significant co-movement is 
detected with only Bahrain and Qatar, Inflation is significantly correlated among member 
countries. We are able to uncover only two positively significant correlations when we look 
into output linkages: Qatar with Bahrain, and the UAE with Saudi Arabia. Therefore, non-oil 
output growth is mostly not correlated among AGCC countries.   
   
Table 4 about here 
 
Section 5  Empirical Results 
We estimate a bivariate SVAR for each of the 10 countries with 2 lags despite in some cases 
the optimal lag length recommended for some countries is higher. According to Enders 
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(2004), OLS estimates are asymptotically efficient and consistent provided that the 
independent variables are the same in each equation. We extract the AD and AS shocks for 
each country and compute the bilateral correlations. Positive correlation indicates symmetry 
while negative correlation indicates asymmetry of shocks.  
 
Table 5 presents the correlation of AGCC countries' non-oil supply shocks with overall 
supply shocks from the US and the core European countries. We also explore the correlation 
of supply shocks between the core European countries to test whether our SVAR models are 
capable of producing results similar to Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994). We report a 
stronger statistically significant correlation of supply shocks at the 5 percent level: 0.90 for 
France with Germany; 0.85 for France with Italy, and 0.81 for Germany and Italy.7 
Surprisingly, we could only detect two significant correlations of supply shocks between 
AGCC countries and the core European countries at the 10 percent level: Qatar with France 
displaying symmetry and the UAE with France exhibiting asymmetry. Supply shocks are 
categorically asymmetric between US and AGCC countries. This can be explained by the fact 
that oil shock is a large component of supply shocks in the US and in Europe while it is 
mostly a demand shock for AGCC countries (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1994).  
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Table 6 presents the correlation coefficients of demand shocks. It shows that the three 
European countries respond similarly to demand disturbances but they are not synchronized 
with AGCC countries. A different picture, however, emerges in relation with the US. With 
the exception of the UAE, demand shocks are mostly symmetric between AGCC countries 
                                                 
7 It appears that 13 years of data since the publication of Bayoumi and Eichengreen's work have made a great 
difference but also this is a sign that economic integration has contributed to the synchronization of the countries 
in response to disturbances. 
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and the US. These relationships are statistically significant. Moreover, when we consider the 
AGCC as a bloc the same relationships surface, suggesting that at least monetary policy from 
the US can potentially serve the purpose of the AGCC countries. Unfortunately, the same 
cannot be said for European monetary policy on the basis of what we could infer from the 
three major European Union members.  
 
Table 6 about here 
 
We report in Table 7 the correlations of both supply and demand shocks among AGCC 
countries. We place the correlation coefficients for supply shocks on the upper triangle while 
those of demand shocks are on the lower one. Demand shocks are mostly symmetrical among 
AGCC countries. Twelve or 80 percent of the fifteen coefficients are positive and statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. UAE's linkages with Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia are 
non-significant. These results are by and large consistent with Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn 
(2006). However, we could not agree with their conclusion that supply shocks are mostly 
asymmetric, hence their stance on the readiness of the Gulf countries to form a monetary 
union. Six or 40 percent of the possible fifteen pairwise correlations are positive and 
statistically significant while only one of the coefficients (UAE-Bahrain, -0.47) is 
significantly negative. Interestingly enough, Saudi Arabia which has the largest economy 
shares common non-oil supply shocks with all but the UAE.8 Percentage-wise, we cannot 
conclude that non-oil supply shocks, and to that effect, supply shocks are asymmetric when 
we are convinced that oil shocks affect these countries in a similar way. Nevertheless, we 
                                                 
8  The discrepancy between the correlation of non-oil output growth results and the responses to shocks is an 
anomaly of the data also found in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) for the case of Canada with the United 
States. In their case, they had used as an alternative quarterly data to confirm their findings, but in our case we 
cannot because such data are not available. 
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shall acknowledge a tighter relationship between the AGCC countries in response to demand 
shocks.  
 
Table 7 about here 
 
To summarize, our results indicate that:  
1) The Euro may not be the appropriate anchor for GCC countries due to shocks 
asymmetry.  
2) Despite the US's misfortune lately, the dollar remains the best option for pegging the 
individual AGCC currencies and the expected single currency to. The US currency 
can at least help five of the six countries, including the largest economy of the region, 
in smoothing demand shocks.  
3) The member country that is to be most concerned about the monetary union with the 
rest should be the UAE not Oman. UAE appears to be on a path of its own. 
4) AGCC countries are on average subject to similar shocks and are therefore good 
candidates for monetary union. They are all reliant on oil and have channeled 
substantial portions of their oil revenues, at a differing degree, towards development 
in infrastructure, manufacturing, and services. Although this is reassuring when we 
consider these countries have in common language, religion, and culture in general, 
labor mobility remains one of the major hurdles in combating asymmetric shocks 
 
 
Section 6 Conclusion  
On the issue of monetary union between AGCC countries and that of pegging the new 
currency of the bloc to the US dollar, this paper has examined the feasibility of monetary 
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union by determining whether these countries are subject to symmetric AD and non-oil AS 
shocks. Since there have been a lot of discussions as to whether the Euro could have been a 
better alternative anchor currency due to the continuous decline of the US dollar, we have 
also tested the suitability of the Euro on the basis of shocks asymmetry between the three 
major European economies and the AGCC countries. The paper follows closely the works of 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) and Horvath and Rátfai  (2004) and employs the structural 
vector autoregression technique to extract the structural shocks. The SVAR models are just-
identified with long-run restrictions à la Blanchard and Quah (1989) that demand shocks 
have no long-run effects on non-oil output. The overall results show that (a) AD shocks are 
unequivocally symmetrical but non-oil AS shocks are weakly symmetrical across AGCC 
countries thereby giving a green light for monetary union; (b) neither AD nor AS shocks are 
symmetrical between AGCC countries and the selected European countries; (c) AGCC's AD 
shocks are symmetrical with the US but non-oil AS shock are not. We therefore surmise that 
the US dollar is a more appropriate candidate for the new currency than the Euro since US 
monetary policy can at least help smooth demand shocks in AGCC countries. This is the 
conclusion reached partially from the cross correlation analysis on non-oil output growth and 
inflation. Our results still hold even when we consider the AGCC countries as a bloc. This 
paper contributes to the debate on the anchor currency by providing statistical evidence to 
AGCC decision makers who have been wrestling with the dilemma of whether to revalue or 
to depeg their actual currencies.  
 
It is worth emphasizing, however, that our findings partially contradict Abu-Bader and Abu-
Qarn's (2006) that supply shocks are asymmetric across AGCC countries. In our view, the 
math just does not add up in Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn's, when we consider oil supply shocks 
are mostly symmetrical across these countries and oil output represents almost 50 percent of 
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the average AGCC country's total output. At best, it is the relative importance of these two 
shocks that should dictate symmetry or asymmetry. Our differences can be explained in part 
by the fact that these authors do not disaggregate real GDP into oil and non-oil components 
and also the unreliability of their dataset, which comes from various sources with differing 
sample sizes.   
 
We are also aware that our finding that US monetary policy can at least help contain demand 
shocks affecting AGCC economies is debatable. Many believe that imported inflation 
resulting from the depreciation of the US dollar lately has worsened the inflation problem in 
these countries. We have however two arguments in response: (1) imported inflation is 
temporary and is a negligible share of total inflation; and (2) as the AGCC economies are 
gearing towards more diversification, the depreciation of the dollar has the potential to boost 
exports and improve current account balances as long as they do not rely to heavily on 
imported raw materials and intermediate goods. The problem of inflation in AGCC countries 
is mostly due to rent and food prices. A better solution is for governments to release the 
pressure on the prices of land they control and the fees they charge to developers so that 
rentals can become affordable. Our paper therefore hints that depegging or revaluing the 
respective currencies to curb inflation will not accomplish much and the choice of the Euro 
instead does not guarantee a better outcome, despite these countries' closer trade links with 
Europe. Moreover, although we rely solely on the dynamics of macroeconomics shocks to 
suggest that a monetary union is feasible among the AGCC countries, labor mobility along 
with the level of intraregional trade remains some of the issues that they must address if they 
want to reap the full benefit of the union. 
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Table 1 
Real non-oil output growth and GDP deflator: means and standard deviations 
 
  Real non-oil output  GDP deflator 
  Mean St. Dev  Mean St. Dev 
Bahrain  2.91 4.96  2.61 4.05 
Kuwait  1.46 7.07  3.79 9.11 
Oman  3.92 4.96  2.81 9.12 
Qatar  2.13 4.29  3.33 6.28 
Saudi Arabia  2.31 3.45  3.23 7.82 
United Arab Emirates  5.61 8.22  1.93 3.41 
GCC  1.02 2.43  2.95 5.73 
USA  0.77 1.09  1.74 1.02 
France  1.06 0.53  2.21 4.77 
Germany  0.94 0.71  2.23 4.90 
Italy  1.00 0.85  2.42 4.68 
Note. Variables are measured in first log differences times 100 
 
 
Table 2 
Correlations of GCC's real non-oil output growth with USA and core European Countries 
output growth 
 
  USA France Germany Italy  
Bahrain  0.04 0.34* 0.17 0.37*  
Kuwait  0.11 0.04 -0.20 -0.04  
Oman  -0.20 -0.09 -0.03 -0.30  
Qatar  0.04 0.20 0.04 0.09  
Saudi Arabia  -0.30 0.08 -0.20 0.11  
United Arab Emirates  -0.19 0.00 -0.08 0.04  
AGCC  -0.20 0.02 -0.20 -0.08  
Note. Variables are measured in first log differences times 100.  
* Significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
Table 3 
Correlations of GCC's inflation with USA and core European Countries 
  USA France Germany Italy  
Bahrain  0.69* -0.04 -0.11 -0.05  
Kuwait  0.49* 0.06 0.10 0.13  
Oman  0.44* 0.06 0.10 0.08  
Qatar  0.42* 0.22 0.14 0.15  
Saudi Arabia  0.53* 0.05 0.11 0.08  
United Arab Emirates  0.04 0.07 0.05 0.03  
AGCC  0.53* 0.09 0.10 0.10  
Note. Variables are measured in first log differences times 100.  
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* Significant at the 5% level. 
Table 4 
Correlations of real non-oil output growth and inflation for GCC countries 
 
 Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi 
Arabia 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Bahrain - 0.68* 0.66* 0.72* 0.67* 0.39* 
Kuwait 0.11 - 0.93* 0.65* 0.94* 0.25 
Oman -0.16 0.10 - 0.63* 0.94* 0.21 
Qatar 0.52* 0.03 -0.07 - 0.64* 0.62* 
Saudi Arabia -0.03 0.00 0.09 0.13 - 0.21 
United Arab 
Emirates 
-0.15 -0.04 0.15 0.00 0.75* - 
Note. The upper triangle contains correlation coefficients for inflation; the lower one presents 
correlation  
coefficients for output. 
*  Significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
Table 5 
Correlation of GCC's non-oil supply shocks with overall supply shocks from USA and 
core European Countries 
 
 USA France Germany Italy 
Bahrain 0.13 0.18 -0.01 0.16 
Kuwait -0.11 -0.10 0.05 -0.12 
Oman -0.08 -0.09 0.06 -0.11 
Qatar 0.02 0.30** 0.16 0.23 
Saudi Arabia 0.10 -0.03 0.07 -0.04 
United Arab Emirates -012 -0.32** -0.23 -0.14 
AGCC 0.07 -0.01 0.06 0.02 
France  - 0.90* 0.85* 
Germany   - 0.81* 
Italy    - 
Note. *,**  Significant at the 5%, 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 6 
Correlation of demand shocks between GCC and USA and core European Countries 
 USA France Germany Italy 
Bahrain 0.69* -0.04 -0.11 -0.05 
Kuwait 0.44* 0.06 0.10 0.08 
Oman 0.44* 0.06 0.10 0.08 
Qatar 0.42* 0.21 0.14 0.15 
Saudi Arabia 0.53* 0.05 0.11 0.08 
United Arab Emirates 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.03 
AGCC 0.53* 0.09 0.10 0.10 
France  - 0.95* 0.88* 
Germany   - 0.85* 
Italy    - 
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Note. *,**  Significant at the 5%, 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Correlation of non-oil supply and demand shocks among GCC countries 
 Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi 
Arabia 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Bahrain - -0.14 -0.03 0.56* 0.35* -0.47* 
Kuwait 0.66* - 0.99* -0.01 0.39* 0.04 
Oman 0.66* 1.00* - 0.08 0.53* -0.02 
Qatar 0.72* 0.63* 0.63* - 0.37* -0.24 
Saudi Arabia 0.67* 0.94* 0.94* 0.64* - -0.22 
United Arab 
Emirates 
0.39* 0.21 0.21 0.62* 0.21 - 
Note. The upper triangle contains correlation coefficients for supply shocks; the lower one 
presents correlation  
coefficients for demand shocks. 
*  Significant at the 5% level. 
 
